We describe and evaluate a bug refutation extension for the Clang Static Analyzer (CSA) that addresses the limitations of the existing built-in constraint solver. In particular, we complement CSA's current heuristics for removing spurious bug reports. We encode the path constraints produced by CSA as Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problems, use SMT solvers to precisely check them for satisfiability, and remove bug reports whose associated path constraints are unsatisfiable. Our refutation extension refutes spurious bug reports in 8 out of 12 widely used open-source applications; on average, it refutes ca. 7% of all bug reports, and never refutes any true bug report. It incurs only negligible performance overheads, and on average adds 1.2% to the runtime of the full Clang/LLVM toolchain. A demonstration is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylW5iRYNsGA.
I. INTRODUCTION
LLVM comprises a set of reusable components for program compilation [1] , differing from other popular compilers, e.g., GCC and its monolithic architecture [2] . Clang [3] is an LLVM component that implements a frontend for C, C++, ObjectiveC and their various extensions. Clang and LLVM are used as the main compiler technology in several closed-and open-source ecosystems, including MacOS and OpenBSD [4] .
The Clang Static Analyzer (CSA) [5] is an open-source project built on top of Clang that can perform context-sensitive interprocedural analysis for programs written in the languages supported by Clang. CSA symbolically executes the program, collects constraints, and reasons about bug reachability using a built-in constraint solver. It was designed to be fast, so that it can provide results for common mistakes (e.g., division by zero or null pointer dereference) even in complex programs. However, its speed comes at the expense of precision, and it cannot handle some arithmetic (e.g., remainder) and bitwise operations. In such cases, CSA can explore execution paths along which constraints do not hold; this can lead to incorrect results being reported. 1 unsigned i n t f u n c ( unsigned i n t a ) { 2 unsigned i n t * z = 0; Consider the program in Fig. 1 . This program is safe, i.e., the unsafe pointer dereference in line 4 is unreachable because the guard in line 3 is not satisfiable; a & 1 holds if the last bit in a is one, and (a & 1)ˆ1 inverts the last bit in a. The analyzer, however, produces the following (spurious) bug report when analyzing the program: main.c:4:12: warning: Dereference of null pointer (loaded from variable 'z') return * z;1 warning generated.
The null pointer dereference reported here means that CSA nevertheless claims to have found a path along which the dereference of z is reachable.
Such spurious bug reports are in practice common; in our experience, about 50% of the reports on large systems (e.g., git) are actually spurious. Junker et al. [6] report similar numbers for a similar static analysis technology. Identifying spurious bug reports and refactoring the code to suppress them puts a large burden on developers and runs the risk of introducing actual bugs; these issues negate the purpose of a lightweight, fast static analysis technology.
Here we present a solution to this conundrum. We first use the fast but imprecise built-in solver to analyze the program and find potential bugs, then use slower but precise SMT solvers to refute (or validate) them; a bug is only reported if the SMT solver confirms that the bug is reachable. We implemented this approach inside the CSA and evaluated it over twelve widely used C/C++ open-source projects of various sizes using five different SMT solvers. Our experiments show that our refutation extension can remove false bug reports from 8 out of the 12 analyzed projects; on average, it refuted 11 (or approximately 7% of all) bug reports per project, with a maximum of 51 reports refuted for XNU; it did not refute any true bug reports. Its performance overheads are negligible and on average our extension adds only 1.2% to the runtime of the full Clang/LLVM toolchain.
II. THE CLANG STATIC ANALYZER
CSA performs a context-sensitive interprocedural data-flow analysis via graph reachability [7] and relies on a set of checkers implementing the logic for detecting specific types of bugs [5] , [8] . Each path in a function is explored, which includes taking separate branches and different loop unrollings. Function calls on these paths are inlined whenever possible, so their contexts and paths are visible from the caller's context.
Real-world programs, however, usually depend on external factors, such as user inputs or results from library components, for which source code is not always available. These unknown values are represented by symbols, and the built-in constraint solver in the static analyzer reasons about reachability based on expressions containing these symbols. The CSA relies on a set of checkers that are engineered to find specific types of bugs, ranging from undefined behaviour to security property violations, e.g., incorrect usage of insecure functions such as strcpy and strcat [9] . The checkers subscribe to events (i.e., specific operations that occur during symbolic execution) that are relevant to their bug targets; for example, the nullability checker subscribes to pointer dereferences. They then check the constraints in the current path and throw warnings if they consider a bug to be reachable.
These checkers can report incorrect results because the symbolic analysis is incomplete (i.e., it can miss some true bugs) and unsound (i.e., it can generate spurious bug reports). The sources of these incorrect results are approximations in two components: the control-flow analysis and the constraint solver.
The control-flow analysis evaluates function calls inside a single translation unit (TU); if the symbolic execution engine finds a function call implemented in another TU, then the call is skipped: pointers and references passed as parameters are invalidated and the function's return value is assumed to be unknown. Cross translation unit support (CTU) is under development [8] ; it is not part of the CSA main branch as of early 2019.
The built-in constraint solver (based on interval arithmetic) was built to be fast rather than precise, and removes expressions from the reasoning if they contain unsupported operations (e.g, remainders and bitwise operations) or are too complex (e.g., contain more than one operator symbol).
The bug reports generated by the checkers are then postprocessed before they are reported to the user. In this final step, a number of heuristics are applied to remove incorrect bug reports and to beautify the others. The reports are also deduplicated, so that different paths that lead to the same bug only generate one report.
As an example of this process, consider the exploded graph [7] in Fig. 2 ; it represents the graph explored by the analyzer when analyzing the program in Fig. 1 . Here, a node s is a pair (V, C), where V is a map var → 2 128 that maps a 64-bit value to each variable var in the program, and C is a map var → 2 128 ×2 128 that maps to each variable the interval constraints required to reach the node. An edge is a tuple (s i , OP, s i+1 ), modeling the constraints on a transition from s i to s i+1 , and OP is a operation performed in the transition, either changing a constraint c ∈ C or a read/write operation over a var. We reserve two special symbols: an node is a property violation and an unknown (but valid) value is shown as " * " in statements.
CSA's "NullDereference" checker adds the transition to representing a dereference of z. Note that no error node is added when the parameter a is read (even if it was not explicitly initialized), because parameters are assumed to be unknown rather than uninitialized values, unless the controlflow analysis infers otherwise. The analyzer will explore all paths in the graph because it cannot infer that the constraint that leads to node s 4 is always false.
III. REFUTING FALSE BUGS USING SMT SOLVERS
One approach to address the limitations of the built-in constraint solver is to replace it by an SMT solver. This approach has been implemented in Clang but empirical evaluations show that it can be up to 20 times slower. We developed an alternative solution; we use the more precise SMT solvers to reason about bug reachability only in the post processing step. CSA already has heuristics in place to remove incorrect bug reports, so we extended those heuristics to precisely encode the constraints into SMT and to check for satisfiability. Fig. 3 illustrates the architecture of our solution. After the static analyzer generates the bug reports, the SMT-based refutation extension will encode the constraints as SMT formulas and check them for satisfiability. CSA already supports constraint encoding in SMT using Z3 [10] but we also implemented support for Boolector [11] , Yices [12] , MathSAT [13] , and CVC4 [14] .
A bug report BR is a straight-line graph representing the path to a property violation (i.e., to an -node). Our refutation extension walks backwards through all nodes s i ∈ BR, collects their constraints, and checks their conjunction for satisfiability. If this formula is unsatisfiable, the bug is spurious.
Our constraint-encoding algorithm is shown as Algorithm 1. Let us assume a set of constraints C, an SMT constraint formula Φ, and a method encode(expr, Φ), which encodes an expression expr in the SMT formula Φ. Algorithm 1 contains two optimizations when encoding constraints: duplicated symbol constraints are ignored (line 2) and if the constraint is a concrete value (the lower bound is equal to the upper bound), the constraint is encoded as an equality (line 3). Note that ignoring symbol constraints in line 2 is only possible because the refutation extension runs from the last node in a bug report (the property violation) to the initial node; any new symbol constraint found when walking backwards will always be a subset of the symbol constraints already encoded. Fig. 4 shows the SMT formula of the bug found when analyzing the program in Fig. 1 . The formula is equivalent to the path [s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 4 , ] in Fig. 2 and $0 is the value of the variable a. Since the formula is unsatisfiable, CSA will not produce a bug report for this path. 1 ( d e c l a r e −f u n $0 ( ) ( BitVec 3 2 ) ) 2 ( a s s e r t (= ( ( e x t r a c t 0 0) $0 ) #b1 ) ) 3 ( a s s e r t (= ( ( e x t r a c t 0 0) $0 ) #b0 ) ) Fig. 4 : The SMT formula of the bug report from Fig. 1 , using Z3. Note that the solver was able to simplify the formula to two assertions: the first bit should be one and zero at the same time. Since this is a contradiction, the formula is UNSAT.
A. Running the Clang Static Analyzer
To run CSA it is enough to use the scan-build tool shipped with Clang. The tool runs CSA during the compilation of the project and it is simple to use: instead of running make, simply run scan-build make. Scan-build offers several options to customize the analysis, including enabling (and disabling) the various checkers in CSA and enabling our refutation extension. Once the build is complete, a detailed report is generated for each reported bug.
To analyze a project with our refutation extension enabled, run scan-build -analyzer-config 'crosscheck-with-z3=true' make. We developed five different SMT backends in the CSA. Of these, however, only Z3 is available as part of the mainstream release of Clang. The backends for Boolector, MathSAT, Yices, and CVC4 are currently only available at https://github.com/mikhailramalho/clang.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The experimental evaluation of our refutation extension consists of two parts. We first present the research questions, projects evaluated, and environment setup, then we compare the analysis results of the CSA with and without the bug refutation extension enabled; the two approaches are compared in terms of number of refuted bugs, and verification time.
A. Experimental Objectives and Setup
Our experimental evaluation seeks to answer two questions: RQ1 (soundness) Is our approach sound and can the refuted bugs be confirmed? RQ2 (performance) Is our approach able to refute spurious bug reports in a reasonable amount of time? We evaluated the new bug refutation extension on twelve open-source C/C++ projects: tmux (v2.7), a terminal multiplexer; redis (v4.0.9), an in-memory database; openSSL (v1. 1.1-pre6) , a software library for secure communication; twin (v0.8.0), a windowing environment; git (v2.17.0), a version control system; postgreSQL (v10.4), an object-relational database management system; SQLite3 (v3230100), a relational database management system; curl (v7.61.0), commandline tool for transferring data; libWebM (v1.0.0.27), a WebM container library; memcached (v1.5.9), a general-purpose distributed memory caching system; xerces-c++ (v3. 2.1) , a validating XML parser; and XNU (v4570.41.2), the operating system kernel used in Apple products.
All experiments were conducted on a desktop computer with an Intel Core i7-2600 running at 3.40GHz and 24GB of RAM. We used Clang v7.0. A time limit of 15s per bug report was set. All scripts to analyze the projects are available in https: //github.com/mikhailramalho/analyzer-projects. is the number of bug reports produced without refutation and refuted bugs is the number of refuted bugs. All solvers refuted the same bugs. There were bugs refuted in 8 out of the 12 analyzed projects: redis, openssl, twin, git, postgresql, sqlite3, xerces, and XNU. On average, 11 bugs were refuted when analyzing each project, with up to 51 bugs refuted in XNU.
B. Bug Refutation Comparison
In total, 89 bugs were refuted and an in-depth analysis of them shows that all were false positives, and thus we affirm RQ1. Our technique is unable to refute all false bugs as the unsound interprocedural analysis is another source of false positives in CSA; this was not addressed in our work.
The average time to analyze the projects with refuted bugs was 35.0 seconds faster: a 6.25% speed up. We thus affirm RQ2. This is because the static analyzer generates html reports for each bug, involving intensive use of I/O (e.g., the html report produced for the program in Fig. 1 is around 25kB ). By removing these false bugs, fewer reports are generated and the analysis is slightly faster. On the four projects where no bug was refuted (tmux, curl, libWebM and memcached), the analysis was 1.0 second slower on average: a 1.24% slowdown.
We average the analysis time of all solvers because their performances were equivalent. For that reason, we did not submit the other backends to the mainstream Clang; we expected different performance between the solvers but all they refuted the same bugs and the analysis times were within 5% from each other. More solvers offer more flexibility, especially license-wise. There is, however, currently no demand for more solvers in the CSA.
V. RELATED WORK Static analysis of programs has seen great improvement in recent years and it has been applied in many cases for the analysis of big real-world projects. Frama-C [15] is an extensible analysis framework based on abstract interpretation for the C language. It also has a large number of plugins for checking different program properties. Infer [16] is an opensource static code analysis tool used for the verification of the Facebook code base and on many mobile apps (e.g., What-sApp). It is adopted by many companies (e.g., Mozilla, Spotify). Cppcheck [17] focuses on detecting dangerous coding practices and undefined behaviours. It was used for detecting many vulnerabilities including a stack overflow in X.org.
The use of SMT solvers as backends for static analysis tools is a well known approach. It has been adopted in the ESBMC [18] C/C++ bounded model checker. It encodes the program as an SMT formula and, depending on its satisfiability, it detects possible bugs. This encoding technique is proved to be sound, however, it does not scale up to real-world programs.
An approach similar to the one adopted in this paper has also been used in Goanna [6] : a C/C++ static analyzer able to scale up to real-world programs (e.g., OpenSSL, WireShark). After detecting all bugs, false ones are eliminated by analyzing the feasibility of error paths using SMT solvers. The biggest difference between Goanna and our approach is in the first (imprecise) analysis: Goanna uses NuXmv and MathSAT5 to generate the bug reports, while we use a custom builtin constraint solver. Similarly to our approach, they use Z3 to encode and refute false bug reports, but we offer a wider selection of SMT solvers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our SMT-based bug refutation extension in CSA is simple but powerful; it prevents reporting the class of false bugs generated by the unsound constraint solver, while introducing minimal overhead to the analysis. Our empirical evaluation shows that the bug refutation extension can consistently reduce the analysis time if bugs are removed, while the slowdown when no bug is refuted is negligible. We used five different solvers in our experiments (Z3, Boolector, MathSAT, Yices and CVC4) and their performance is equivalent; our refutation extension using Z3 is already part of Clang v7.
Our experiments show that the CSA constraint solver is not the largest source of imprecision; replacing it by a more precise SMT solver leaves an estimated 85% of the spurious bug reports unrefuted. We conjecture that these are caused by the approximations in the TU-based control flow analysis (CFA). In future work, we will replace it by a CTU-based CFA during refutation and also extract test inputs from the counterexamples to double-check reachability so as to increase our precision.
